ロールズの第二原理とその平等主義的性格 (下)

Abstract

John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness has often been regarded as an origin of "luck egalitarianism" in contemporary political philosophy. This paper aims to argue against this view and explore its true egalitarian character underlying Rawls' theory of justice. This paper is divided into two main parts. In this second part I will clarify what Rawls intends when he claims that social and natural contingencies are arbitrary from moral point of view. This claim is meant to point out a need to find some independent justification for the social and economic inequalities, which reflect the unequal distribution of natural abilities and familial circumstances between individuals. Then I will reconstruct a coherent argument for the difference principle from the above findings and explicate the true egalitarian character underlying Rawls' theory of justice. Difference principle is designed to cancel out a meritocratic tendency conceived in the ideal of equality of opportunity and thereby establish the basic equality as citizens, who can willingly participate in the social cooperation governed by the principles of justice.