「拡張した心」と認知の全体論

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the problem of the unit of mind. Traditionally, each individual has been regarded as such a unit. However, recently, some authors have claimed that our cognitive systems or processes are extended beyond our individuals into our environments. Here I examine Clark & Chalmers' 'extended mind (EM)' hypothesis. I describe how Clark & Chalmers propose a condition for a process to be a cognitive one, on the basis of what I call 'functionalistic holism'. They then argue that some external processes could meet this condition. However, I argue that the condition they propose fails to allow for the possibility of external processes to be consistently cognitive. I propose to reconstruct the EM hypothesis not on the basis of a rather modest, functionalistic holism, but instead on the basis of a more radical holism. According to this latter position, being cognitive is not an attribute of each process understood as part of some system, but of the whole system itself. I conclude that cognitive processes cannot meaningfully be said to be extended, but instead that cognitive systems are themselves extended. After all, I maintain the thesis that the unit of mind goes beyond each individual in this sense.