何かを意味するということ

Abstract

What is it for one to mean something by uttering something? This is the problem of "utterer's meaning". In this article, I propose a new approach to this problem, according to which utterer's meaning is based on evidence-relation between utterer's utterance and her belief. This view is contrasted with so far the most influential approach to utterer's meaning, which is called intention-based semantics. Theorists of intention-based semantics hold that utterer's meaning is essentially a kind of her intention. This article consists of three sections. The first section gives an overview of intention-based semantics and the reason why this view is problematic. The second section introduces my approach which I call "belief-evidence semantics". This section also contains a characterization of the concept of evidence in terms of abductive reasoning. The third section is a supplementary one, where an implication of belief-evidence semantics is examined. Belief-evidence semantics, together with Peirce's idea of the continuity between perception and abduction, makes it possible that we sometimes misperceive an utterer's meaning. This happens when, for example, we read a novel, watch a theater performance, or see a robot talking. This article concludes that utterer's meaning is accounted in terms of evidence-relation between uttering and believing, and that this view has several advantages over the traditional intention-based view.