<サーヴェイ論文>帰結論証の定式化の進展と演算子「N」の強弱

Abstract

The Consequence Argument is the most influential argument, aiming to establish the incompatibility of leeway freedom and determinism. Since its appearance, several philosophers have attacked it. To address these attacks, various attempts to improve the Consequence Argument has been made. In this survey article, I articulate the development of the formalization of the Consequence Argument by focusing on the inference rule (β) and the operator ‘N’. This article has the following structure. In section 1, I explain the most standard formulation of the Consequence Argument, namely P. van Inwagen's third argument. In section 2, I overview the criticisms against the inference rule (β), especially the early critiques and the counter-example, given by T. J. McKay and D. Johnson, based on the rule of the agglomeration. In section 3, I examine the strategy to defend the rule (β) from the counter-example by appealing to two requirements that must be met to defense leeway compatibilism. In section 4, I give an overview of the two remedies used to reform the Consequence Argument, strengthening the rule (β) or the operator ‘N’. I also explain M. Huemer's Consequence Argument, which reflects these improvements, and examine J. Gustafson's argument regarding how we should strengthen the premises of the Consequence Argument. Finally, I show that we can obtain two morals from these debates. First, we must offer a concrete explication of leeway freedom to defense leeway compatibilism. Second, we should consider the formal results of counterfactual theory.