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dc.contributor.author | 山名, 諒 | ja |
dc.contributor.alternative | Yamana, Ryo | en |
dc.contributor.transcription | ヤマナ, リョウ | ja-Kana |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-07-22T04:14:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-07-22T04:14:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-07-01 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/275523 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Are we brains in a vat? In the opening chapter of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam addresses this brain-in-a-vat skepticism and attempts to refute it. Against his argument is a famous criticism raised by Anthony Brueckner. In this paper, through the analysis of the failure of Putnam's argument, I offer a more promising version of refutation in the form of a transcendental argument. The first section of this article clarifies the distinctive feature which makes the brain-in-a-vat scenario attractive to many people. Thus, attacking the skeptical scenario is thereby clarified as a significant task. In the second section, Putnam's refutation of skepticism is introduced. The only premise which Putnam explicitly adopts is the causal constraint principle, according to which a term refers to an object only if there is an appropriate causal relation between them. Accordingly, Putnam aims to show that the skepticism is self-refuting, that if we can consider whether the sentence “I am a brain in a vat” is true or false, it must be false. In the third section, I consider Brueckner's criticism of Putnam's self-refutation argument. Brueckner claims that for Putnam's argument to succeed, we need to apply the disquotational principle to the sentence. But that begs the question, he argues. I examine why Putnam begs the question and whether he is to blame for this. In the final section, I show that the brain-in-a-vat skepticism cannot be stated without presupposing that it is false by reformulating Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument. I conclude that this skepticism is impossible since it violates the condition of its own possibility. | en |
dc.language.iso | jpn | - |
dc.publisher | 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科『人間存在論』刊行会 | ja |
dc.rights | © 京都大学 大学院人間・環境学研究科『人間存在論』刊行会 2022 | ja |
dc.subject.ndc | 100 | - |
dc.title | 水槽の中の脳を退治する | ja |
dc.title.alternative | Exorcising the Brains in a Vat | en |
dc.type | departmental bulletin paper | - |
dc.type.niitype | Departmental Bulletin Paper | - |
dc.identifier.ncid | AN10540500 | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | 人間存在論 | ja |
dc.identifier.volume | 28 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 29 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 42 | - |
dc.textversion | publisher | - |
dc.sortkey | 03 | - |
dc.address | 京都大学大学院人間・環境学研究科 | ja |
dc.address.alternative | Doctral Student at Kyoto University | en |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
dc.identifier.pissn | 1341-2698 | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle-alternative | Menschenontologie | de |
出現コレクション: | 第28号 |
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