<研究論文(原著論文)>人と人以外との倫理構築に向けて: 「アニミズム」「テクノアニミズム」概念の限界と可能性

Abstract

The terms ‟animism” and ‟techno-animism” are broadly misunderstood. On the one hand, psychologists tend to see animism as a state that people cannot distinguish living things from non-living things, on the other hand, social theorists use animism with various meanings. There is great confusion around these terms. I propose organizing the various concepts of ‟animism” by categories that are inspired by J. Piaget, even though his contribution is not appreciated properly. I suggest that there are three categories of animism. Animism-1 is a state that people cannot distinguish living things from non-living things, or reality from fantasy. Animism-2 means a state that people can distinguish living things from non-living things to some degree, yet the differentiation does not reach completion. Animism-3 is a state that people can recognize living and non-living things at the same time, while knowing there is a clear difference. The last category includes ‟techno-animism” in which people see animacy even in products of technology. ‟Animism” has been attributed to a so-called primitive state of cognition, but animistic mentality is rather normal in everyone, not only in children or primitive tribes, but also in adults or modernized societies. Japan has an animistic culture such as Shintoism and is (in)famous for creation of fantasy with techno-animism. However, my analysis shows the uniqueness of Japan is only in juxtaposition of industrialization and techno-animism. Humans might be animists by default, but sometimes feel the need to oppress animistic thoughts. In the modern world, we need to pretend to be rational and sane, thus magic and fantasy are just for children. Nevertheless, ethics between humans and non-humans that we need right now, such as an ethic of animals, ethic of robots, and ethic of environment seem to require an amalgam of animistic mentality and rational drive.