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Title: On Arbitration for the Bayesian Collective Choice Problem
Authors: Zeng, Dao-Zhi
Ohnishi, Masamitsu
Ibaraki, Toshihide
Chen, Ting
Issue Date: 31-Jan-1995
Publisher: Faculty of Engineering, Kyoto University
Journal title: Memoirs of the Faculty of Engineering, Kyoto University
Volume: 57
Issue: 1
Start page: 27
End page: 40
Abstract: This paper deals with arbitration for the Bayesian collective choice problem. A similar problem is discussed in Myerson (1979) under the assumption that the arbitrator chooses a bargaining solution, derived from the generalized Nash product of Harsanyi and Selten (1972). This paper, however, asserts that arbitration differs from pure bargaining, because an arbitrator behaves so that the fairness-utility function evaluated by himself is maximized. We argue that the functional form of the fairness-utility function is uniquely determined if the arbitrator acts according to some plausible criteria.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/281500
Appears in Collections:Vol.57 Part 1

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