<研究論文(原著論文)>美学における意図論争の再描像 --言語行為論を応用して--

Abstract

Among recent philosophers of art, there has been an intense debate over the role of the author's intention in artistic interpretation. In this “intention debate, ” the view called intentionalism holds that the actual intention of the author is (at least) relevant to the determination of the artwork's meaning, while anti-intentionalism denies that. In this paper, I point out that there is an unrecognized problem in this debate: both intentionalism and anti-intentionalism seem to treat many interpretive practices as exceptions, without any appropriate justification. Furthermore, because of this apparent arbitrariness of each account, it has become difficult to grasp the point at issue of this debate. Given this situation, this paper proposes a new framework for the interpretation of fictional works, which relies on the speech-act theory. According to this framework, there are three kinds of acts performed by a fictional work: fictional locutionary acts, fictional illocutionary acts, and fictional perlocutionary acts. With this distinction, this paper classifies some views on the intention debate and shows that their explanations about exceptional cases can be justified. Through this argument, this paper also clarifies where views on the intention debate conflict with each other and suggests a future direction for this debate.