ダウンロード数: 469

このアイテムのファイル:
ファイル 記述 サイズフォーマット 
kjs_030_001.pdf680.25 kBAdobe PDF見る/開く
完全メタデータレコード
DCフィールド言語
dc.contributor.author安里, 和晃ja
dc.contributor.alternativeASATO, Wakoen
dc.contributor.transcriptionアサト, ワコウja-Kana
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-19T04:36:34Z-
dc.date.available2023-05-19T04:36:34Z-
dc.date.issued2022-12-25-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2433/282728-
dc.description.abstractAs Japan has ratified ILO Convention No. 181, domestic laws prohibit workers from paying placement fees but allow high placement fees to be paid by migrants from other countries. The Technical Intern Trainee Program (TITP) accepts a high initial fee of JPY542, 000 on average. The average initial fee rises to JPY880, 000 for persons who have absconded from their workplaces. The placement fee is strongly associated with the absconsion ratio. While movement of persons under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) stipulates that no placement fees shall be borne by a worker, the TITP continues to operate with a high placement fee, which constitutes a double standard among receiving systems. In addition, despite the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC), under the revised TITP Act, the disparity between the Philippines, where there are no recruitment fees, and countries with no upper restrictions is stark. This indicates that Japan's migration policy lacks consistent basic principles and price control mechanisms. The TITP maintains a well-developed financial market with an extensive network of sending organizations that makes high placement fees possible. The problem in the international labor market is that high placement fees such as those charged in Vietnam and Myanmar, are highly preferred by receiving organizations. Low placement fees, such as those under the EPA, are shunned in favor of high placement fees for TITP which keeps total costs for receiving organizations low. This reverse preference is nothing short of ironic. However, high-cost placement will not only impose a tremendous economic and psychological burden on workers but will also lead to high social costs due to lower productivity and high absconsion rates. The current vicious cycle of high preference for workers with high placement fees is not beneficial to the worker, the company, or Japanese society. Reduction of absconsion rates should not be treated as a individual problem but rather as a social problem. High placement fees can only be eliminated through price control mechanisms aimed at overcoming the failures of the international labor market.en
dc.language.isojpn-
dc.publisher京都大学大学院文学研究科社会学研究室ja
dc.publisher.alternativeDepartment of Sociology, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto Universityen
dc.rights本誌に掲載された原稿の著作権は、社会学研究室に帰属するものとする。ja
dc.subject.ndc361-
dc.title<論文>国際労働市場と高額化する斡旋料 : 技能実習制度における価格管理の失敗ja
dc.title.alternative<ARTICLES>International labor market and high placement fees: Failure of price control in respect of TITP migrants in Japanen
dc.typedepartmental bulletin paper-
dc.type.niitypeDepartmental Bulletin Paper-
dc.identifier.ncidAN10461313-
dc.identifier.jtitle京都社会学年報 : KJSja
dc.identifier.volume30-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage25-
dc.textversionpublisher-
dc.sortkey02-
dc.address京都大学大学院文学研究科社会学専修准教授ja
dcterms.accessRightsopen access-
dc.identifier.jtitle-alternativeKyoto Journal of Sociologyen
出現コレクション:第30号【落合恵美子教授退職記念号】

アイテムの簡略レコードを表示する

Export to RefWorks


出力フォーマット 


このリポジトリに保管されているアイテムはすべて著作権により保護されています。