<論文>労働条件を切り下げる「底辺への競争」 --技能実習制度における価格管理政策

Abstract

“The race to the bottom” is a competitive principle among states as players in the international labor market, seeking to maximize their benefits. Each state's labor export strategies differ; for instance, the Philippines and Thailand have been practicing zero recruitment fees with a minimum absconsion ratio of less than one percent, while Vietnam allows a fee of $3, 600, leading to actual payments averaging 660, 000 yen, with absconders paying an average of 1, 020, 000 yen. This significantly reduces wages during the stay, effectively undermining minimum wage standards. “The race to the bottom” increases absconsion ratio at more than three percent among those states from high recruitment fee and brings various social costs of Japan. However, effective interventions for sending countries have been scarce. Before the reform act of the Immigration Control Act, the JITCO was responsible for the TITP operation, with inadequate supervision. The guarantee bond to prevent absconsion, previously considered a necessary evil by the government administrations of Japan, was declared illegal in 2009. The 2016 TITP Act required signing Memorandums of Cooperation (MOC) with sending countries. However, these memorandums, not binding domestic law, were largely ineffective. Hence, disparities in initial costs between the Philippines and Vietnam remained unchanged. The Economic Partnership Agreement scheme of nurses and care workers from Vietnam, the Philippines and Indoneisa exercise zero recruitment fee since 2008, in which absconsion has never been an issue. Therefore, systemic revisions of TITP are required before individual accountability of absconsions.