「高邁なる者」の形而上学的基礎 --デカルトにおける書簡の道徳と『情念論』の道徳--

Abstract

In the interpretation of Descartes's moral philosophy, it has been pointed out that there is a difference between the morality developed in his correspondence with Elisabeth (in 1645) and with Chanut and Christine (in 1647-1649) and the morality developed in The Passions of the Soul (1649). On the one hand, in the letter to Elisabeth of 15 September 1645, Descartes gives as a necessary condition for being “always disposed to judge well” the reflection on metaphysical truths based on his philosophical principles; then, in the letter to Chanut of 1 February 1647, he takes up these truths again and develops a morality oriented on the love for God. On the other hand, in The Passions of the Soul, he discusses a morality of generosity, which is based on the knowledge about Free will (libre arbitre). Thus, explaining this difference constitutes an interpretative challenge in understanding Descartes's moral philosophy. This paper focuses on this problem and tries to offer an interpretation that can overcome it. First, I will identify the historical background of the concept of generosity and its reception by Descartes. Next, I will make it clear that the concept of legitimate self-esteem (estime légitime de soi-même) plays an essential role in understanding generosity, and this concept has a metaphysical link to the love for God. Then, referring to Rodis-Lewis's reading, which interprets the morality of generosity as the last fruit of the development of the theory of free will in Descartes, I will argue that legitimate self-esteem is supported metaphysically not only by the love for God but also by knowledge about free will. Finally, I will insist that it is possible to unravel the apparent difference between the morality of the Letters and the morality of the Passions of the Soul consistently by paying close attention to the concept of legitimate self-esteem.