<論文>『論理学』はいかなる意味で「論理」の学であるか --あるいはヘーゲルは真矛盾主義者であるか--

Abstract

This study explores the logic behind Hegel's main work, Science of Logic, from a dialetheism viewpoint. In previous interpretations of Hegelian contradictions in the Logic, a conflict between the Kantian interpretation, which regards contradictions as resolvable within a network of inferential holism, and the metaphysical interpretation, which regards contradictions as intrinsic properties of objects, was emphasized. However, among the dialetheism-based interpretations in recent years, we find a third way which rather interprets propositions as the bearers of Hegelian contradictions and truth. Following this line of inquiry, this study argues that the Logic presupposes a framework of logic that has some affinity with modern propositional logic. The paper presents this argument mainly in the following two ways. First, this paper presents, through historical accounts of philosophy, the substantial influence of Schelling's identity philosophy on Hegel's theory of truth during his Jena period in that both share the basic idea that the “truth” of a proposition can contradict the “certainty” of that proposition. This study pursues this influence to Hegel's theory of truth in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which distinguishes, in the part of Preliminary conception (Vorbegriff), between the primary division of two “attitudes” toward truth: the metaphysical and Kantian “attitude.” Second, the paper presents a reconstruction of the “dialectic” of Science of Logic from the logical viewpoint of dialetheism. The study argues that the contradictions presented in the “logic of being” and “logic of essence” of the Logic presupposes the two contrasting attitudes of thought toward objectivity, which correspond to the “attitudes” toward truth in the Encyclopedia: the metaphysical and Kantian views of truth. Based on these considerations, particularly the “dialectic” of the Logic, this study concludes that, the two contrasting views of truth inevitably invert into the other, and that Hegelian contradiction exposes the one-sidedness of these “attitudes” that can be expressed only within the framework of a proposition.