<研究論文(原著論文)>非ヒト動物の痛みをめぐって --不在性論証と不可知性論証の検討--

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate among theorists about whether non-human animals, such as fish, feel pain. Some proponents argue that fish can experience pain, while critics challenge this view. In this paper, we examine these criticisms by formulating them into two arguments and analyzing their implications. The first argument against the idea that fish feel pain is the absence argument, which asserts that we cannot attribute pain experiences to fish. Proponents of fish pain often counter this claim by appealing to the principle of multiple realizability, suggesting that pain can be realized in different ways across species. If this principle holds, proponents of fish pain may be justified in endorsing the idea that fish experience pain. However, they then face the second argument, the agnostic argument, which maintains that, in principle, it is unknowable whether we can attribute pain experiences to fish. As a result, proponents of fish pain encounter significant challenges when attempting to establish that fish experience conscious pain. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis reveals that advocates of these criticisms face difficulties of their own. These theorists are confronted with a dilemma: either they cannot accept the possibility of attributing pain experiences to all non-human animals, or they risk becoming entangled in the same agnostic argument they direct at proponents of fish pain. In conclusion, this paper argues that the objections to fish pain present significant challenges for both proponents and critics alike. Therefore, further discussion is necessary regarding the nature of animal pain.