Spinoza's Actualities

Abstract

Spinoza's metaphysics is often said to be “necessitarian, ” mainly based on EIP16 (and its corollaries, such as EIP29 and EIP33). There is a controversy, however, as to whether Spinoza is a “strong” necessitarian in the sense of endorsing the thesis that the actual world is the only possible world, or whether he is a mere determinist (or “weak” necessitarian). The main focus of the debate is on the existence of multiple or infinitely many possible series compatible with what are necessarily produced and determined. In the first section of this essay, I show that both sides of this controversy have difficulties reconciling their interpretations with the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), to which Spinoza is clearly committed. Then, in the second section, I propose an alternative interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics, in which all of the infinitely many possible series are actualized in the sense of following from the nature of the substance. In this sense of actuality, the range of the actual corresponds to that of the possible. But Spinoza's system contains another kind of actuality, i.e., “enduring, ” which can be interpreted as an indexical actuality discussed by David Lewis. As a result, “actuality” has two distinct meanings in Spinoza's system. In the last section, I illustrate how such an interpretation solves some problems for commentators of Spinoza, especially the problem of the inconsistency with the PSR.