<論説>「民族覚醒」の起源をめぐる謬説とその継承 --独立後インドネシアにおけるイスラーム的ナショナリスト史観-- (特集 : 嘘)

Abstract

標準的なインドネシア史の説明では、最初のナショナリスト団体は一九〇八年設立のブディ・ウトモとされる。しかし、インドネシア独立直後の一九五〇年代に、イスラーム(商業)同盟がそれ以前に結成されたとする説が唱えられ始めた。この謬説は、当時の政治的なイデオロギー対立を背景に現れたイスラーム的ナショナリスト史観の論点の一つを成してきた。歴史学の立場からは繰り返し否定され、公的な歴史書に取り入れられることもなかったが、この謬説は大衆作家の著作によって社会に広まり、イスラーム出版市場の中では存続していった。スハルト体制崩壊後に歴史叙述の見直しが進むと、イスラーム勢力に現れた「保守化」傾向や「多数派主義」の動きと相まって、イスラーム的ナショナリスト史観が脚光を浴び、この謬説も取り上げられるようになった。しかし、この歴史観は決して新しいものではなく、現在の歴史叙述の見直しが求める要件を満たすようなものではない。

In standard narratives of Indonesian history, the first nationalist organization is considered to have been Boedi Oetomo, founded in 1908, and the date of its establishment is now celebrated as “National Awakening Day.” However, in the 1950s, shortly after Indonesia gained independence, some began to assert that the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), or its predecessor, Sarekat Dagang Islam, was established earlier than Boedi Oetomo, which is often regarded as non-Islamic or anti-Islamic. This claim clearly contradicts contemporary historical records and has been dismissed by Western and Japanese researchers and even by most Indonesian researchers. Nonetheless, within Indonesian society, this account has persisted and even seems to have gained support in recent years. This paper examines how the fallacy regarding the process of the Islamic Union's founding has been perpetuated. It attempts to elucidate a specific trend in the historical perspective of Islamic groups in Indonesia -- a perspective that can be termed “Islamic nationalist historiography” – and its transformation and continuity, as well as contemporary issues associated with it. Special attention is given to how this fallacy has been treated through the creation of official historical narratives by Indonesian government agencies. The fallacy regarding the founding of the Islamic Union originated from the accounts made in his later years by H. Samanhoedi, who is considered the founder of the organization. He apparently gave such an explanation simply to exaggerate his contributions to the independence movement. His accounts gained significance against the background of ideological conflicts in 1950s Indonesia and were supported by certain factions within the Islamic movement, such as Tamar Djaja and Hamka, both journalists and writers. While another Islamic intellectual who later became a famous historian, Deliar Noer refuted their claims based on documents and interviews, the fallacy continued to spread within Indonesian society through works of popular writers, such as biographies of national heroes. At the second National Seminar on History held in 1970, Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara and Yahya Dimyati took up this fallacy, demanding that the origins of “National Awakening” in official historical narratives be changed from the founding of Boedi Oetomo to that of the Islamic Trade Union. Although their claims were not adopted in government-published history books like the National History of Indonesia (Sejarah National Indonesia), they survived in the Islamic publishing market. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, as existing historical narratives were reassessed, and amidst tendencies of “conservatism” and “majoritarianism” within Islamic groups, some researchers and history enthusiasts began advocating for the “Islamization of Indonesian history.” As a result, Islamic nationalist historiography gained prominence, and the fallacy regarding the process of the Islamic Union's founding received renewed attention. In this fashion, this fallacy has become a part of Islamic nationalist historiography. This historical view emerged in the 1950s as part of an effort to spread Islamic values within society. Regarding the fallacy, this historical perspective was still vague in Tamar Djaja's works but gained a clearer outline in Suryanegara's account. A notable characteristic of this historiography is its emphasis on the central role of Islam, the majority religion, in shaping Indonesian nationalism and the independence movement while denouncing elements perceived as non-Islamic or anti-Islamic. However, this historiography fundamentally presupposes the existence of a nation-state and discusses its formation from an anti-colonial perspective. In this regard, Islamic nationalist historiography shares an “Indonesia-centrism” with the dominant nationalist historiography of postindependence Indonesia. Indonesian scholars advocating for reinventing national historical narratives, such as Agus Suwignyo and Asvi Warman Adam, are critical of the claims for the “Islamization of Indonesian history.” Furthermore, although these two have not discussed it in detail, the Islamic nationalist historical perspective is not something new but merely an Islamic version of the nationalist historiography based on an Indonesia-centric perspective, which itself is now being criticized by Indonesian historians as something to be overcome. Finally, as is evident from the perpetuation of the fallacy surrounding the Islamic Union's founding process, the most significant problem of studies based on this historical perspective is inadequate scrutiny of contemporary sources and previous studies. The fallacy regarding its founding represents nothing but the remnants of past ideological conflicts.