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DCフィールド | 値 | 言語 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Itoh, Hideshi | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-04-25T01:47:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-04-25T01:47:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1993-10 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Itoh, Hideshi. "Job design, delegation, and cooperation : a principal-agent analysis". [京都大学経済学部] Working paper. 京都大学経済学部, 1993, No.21, 11p. | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/37916 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organizational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' tasks are divided among them. In the framework of the standard principal-agent relationship with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them specialize in just one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents. | en |
dc.format.extent | 2562892 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | 京都大学経済学部 | ja |
dc.publisher.alternative | Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University | en |
dc.subject.ndc | 330 | - |
dc.title | Job design, delegation, and cooperation : a principal-agent analysis | en |
dc.type | research report | - |
dc.type.niitype | Research Paper | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | 京都大学経済学部Working Paper | ja |
dc.identifier.issue | 21 | - |
dc.textversion | author | - |
dc.sortkey | 021 | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
出現コレクション: | Working Paper (外国語論文) |
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