エージェンシー理論における交渉力と業績評価 : ツォイテン＝ナッシュ交渉解に関連して

Abstract

It is proposed to show that agency theory and Zeuthen-Nash theory of bargaining are complementary in a given condition. In order to show this, it is necessary to take a approach to introduce uncertainty of demmand into Zeuthen-Nash theory. Moreover, based on the conception mentioned above, the meaning of agency theory is discussed compared with Zeuthen-Nash theory. In the two points, Zeuthen-Nash theory is essential for agency theory. First, agency theory is based on a given outcome of bargaining. Second, the assumption of the perfect knowledge of the utility function of the party is unnatural, and so it is learnt from bargaining process. Besides, the risk attitudes and the type of utility function are the determinants of income distribution in the both theories, but they have the different economic significance in each theory. In this relation, it is explained that performance evaluation system is the determinant of the income distribution within a firm. Finally, the significance and relationship of performance evaluation system and bargaining power are discussed after due consideration of the Agency theory expanded by introducing bargaining power.