インドネシア「新秩序」とその政治的近代化

Abstract

This article attempts to analyze Indonesia's New Order under its post-1965 military leadership in light of its political modernization. The discussion assumes that the ability of the ruling elite to implement political modernization depends upon four conditions : first, the ruling elite must be able to maintain national unity in a political and geographical sense; second, it must define national objectives appropriate to prevailing national conditions; third, it must formulate economic plans and organize an effective administration for their execution; and fourth, it must allow for political groups to function as long as they support the goals and directions of Indonesia as prescribed by the ruling elite. The current military elite has demonstrated its ability to restore and maintain national unity, and to define the appropriate national objectives through the new political symbols of "development" and "Panca Sila democracy." Since 1969 the regime has launched the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, by which the regime has sought to justify its own existence and which has functioned as a symbol of national unity to a great degree. This regime also has earned political legitimacy through the general elections of 1971, which resulted in the victory of its party, Golkar. Although these actions encourage Indonesia's political modernization, there are other factors which seem to stifle it. The regime has mobilized highly educated technocrats into economic planning, but they have encountered many difficulties in implementing it effectively. The Javanese-dominated "moderate" wing of the Army, which controls the post-1966 Indonesian government, has consolidated its political position by eliminating the Army's more "radical" leaders, weakening the Indonesian Nationalist and Muslim Parties, regrouping the nine political parties into two large ones, and placing Golkar under the control of the Defense and Security Department. Although the Suharto leadership has been strengthened temporarily by these actions, its lack of political generosity in maintaining competing groups within the political system appears to have stifled desirable political development in Indonesia. Although the Suharto government may tolerate a low level of political development, it can not afford failure in economic development. In short, the future of the current Five-Year Development Plan and its succeeding plans, which are so much a symbol of national unity, may well determine the political life of the regime.