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Title: タイのクーデタ, 1980~1991年 : 軍の同期生, 内部抗争, 対政府関係
Other Titles: Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991: Classmates, Internal Conflicts and Relations with the Government of the Military
Authors: 玉田, 芳史  kyouindb  KAKEN_id
Author's alias: Tamada, Yoshifumi
Issue Date: Mar-1992
Publisher: 京都大学東南アジア研究センター
Journal title: 東南アジア研究
Volume: 29
Issue: 4
Start page: 389
End page: 421
Abstract: There were two abortive attempts and one successful coup under the Prem (1980-88) and Chatchai governments (1988-91) in Thailand. This paper tries to analyse the main causes of these three coups by focusing upon internal conflict in the armed forces, especially the army, and their relations with the government. The internal conflict centers upon the struggle for more important positions by factions of army officers. The most strategic factions are formed on the basis of being classmates at the army academy. The Class 7 group, who graduated from the academy in 1960,attempted a coup to get rid of growing rival factions among Prem's supporters in 1981. Arthit, hero of the suppression of this attempt, bacame army chief in 1982 and built his own faction, which later split into two as he came to challenge Prem and his retirement approached. Discord between the two culminated in the abortive coup of 1985. Chawalit, a leader of Class 1,having put down the attempt with the collaboration of Class 5,bacame army chief the next year and tried to restore unity to the army leadership by means of a balanced reshuffle. Under him the government and the military became on good terms. But when Chatchai dared to challenge the military, which had come under the firm control of Class 5 after Chawalit's resignation in 1990,the military staged the successful coup of 1991. Although the existence of vying factions may be a significant factor in a coup attempt, it may also be a deterrent because a faction must consider the attitudes and strengths of the other factions. The monarch can refuse to sanction a coup if there are countervailing factions among the military. But for such factions, it is difficult to defeat a coup attempt. This is the case with the 1991 coup.
Description: この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
Appears in Collections:Vol.29 No.4

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