Participatory Management Structure of Large-Scale People's Irrigation System: The Case of the Soprong Muang Fai System, Northern Thailand

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the management structure used by farmers in a large-scale muang fai irrigation system in northern Thailand in developing, managing, operating, and maintaining their irrigation system. A qualitative analysis of empirical data on the historical development, physical conditions, water distribution and maintenance practices as well as the organizational management of the Soprong muang fai group revealed that this system uses a participatory management structure. In order to cope with the large number of irrigation water users and widely dispersed irrigation areas, social organization, based on a village representation system, precedes hydraulic manipulation. Village irrigation delegates are nominated by village irrigation water users and endorsed by their village headmen to participate in inter-village irrigation management planning and to take charge of irrigation management within their villages. The effectiveness of this management structure hinges on the skills of the delegates and the muang fai manager, who is directly elected by members and thus accountable to all irrigation members regardless of their villages, in building a consensus on a practical inter-village irrigation management plan. The existence of a forum in which the delegates meet reduces information asymmetry across villages regarding water requirements and availability as well as physical and human conditions, and any issues that may cause distrust can be worked out. The common goal of the forum is to treat every village irrigation group and irrigation user equally by providing all of them with necessary irrigation water and with a clear, common water management, maintenance and cost-sharing plan. This plan, subsequently announced publicly by the muang fai manager as the agreement of the muang fai group, frames how each village irrigation delegate should organize the water management and maintenance in their respective villages and contribute to the Soprong group. The status of village irrigation delegates is such that they can use social sanctions against potential violators of the agreement with support from the muang fai manager and village headmen as needed. The peculiar distribution of canal maintenance costs in this system points out the delicacy needed in applying the principle of equality in large-scale systems.