Sustainability of Micro-credit System in Rural China

Abstract

中国農村部では農村信用社による小額信用貸付が農民の資金調達の機会を拡大させている。しかしその一方で，農民の債務不履行も発生しており，小額信用貸付システムの持続可能性が問題となっている。本研究では小額信用貸付システムの破綻の可能性を考慮した2期間モデルによって，農民の返済努力のインセンティブについて分析する。分析の結果，農民に最大の努力を引き出すための有限な貸付規模が存在することが明らかになった。

As the main micro-credit institutions in rural China, Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) are suffering the unsuccessful repayment induced by rural households' ignoring about RCCs' sustainability. And that will damage the long-term benefit of rural households and RCCs. In this paper we are trying to solve above problem by introducing a two-period model. As one exciting result, we found that the expected utility in the future will give rural households positive incentive to care about RCCs' sustainability. And there is one optimal loan size for RCCs' sustainability and the loan interest rate should be kept at some adequate level.