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タイトル: Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding
著者: Kono, Hisaki  kyouindb  KAKEN_id
著者名の別形: 高野, 久紀
キーワード: Microcredit
Joint liability
Free riding
Contagion
発行日: Sep-2014
出版者: Elsevier Inc.
誌名: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
巻: 33
開始ページ: 96
終了ページ: 113
抄録: The advent of microcredit financing has remarkably improved access to credit for the poor in many developing countries. Although several microcredit programs have adopted the joint liability scheme, economic theory suggests that joint liability could increase strategic default through contagion and free-riding. This paper aims at studying the extent of free-riding and contagion in joint liability lending. By using data from experimental repayment games conducted in Vietnam, with noisy signals that resemble actual microcredit programs, we found that subjects were motivated to free-ride under the joint liability scheme. While most empirical research in this area has focused on the problem of contagion, our findings point to the significance of investigating free-riding behavior under joint liability schemes. Analyses reveal that the free-riding tendency may be led by the irresponsiveness of repayment and shouldering behavior to the partner’s seemingly strategic default in the previous round.
著作権等: © 2014 Elsevier Inc.
This is not the published version. Please cite only the published version. この論文は出版社版でありません。引用の際には出版社版をご確認ご利用ください。
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/189387
DOI(出版社版): 10.1016/j.jjie.2013.12.006
出現コレクション:学術雑誌掲載論文等

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