このアイテムのアクセス数: 336
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| DCフィールド | 値 | 言語 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Asano, Takao | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Kunieda, Takuma | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Shibata, Akihisa | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-09-22T00:14:30Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-09-22T00:14:30Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-09 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/189748 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent's overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive spillovers and an agent's underconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and negative spillovers can lead to Pareto improvement. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University | en |
| dc.publisher.alternative | 京都大学経済研究所 | ja |
| dc.subject | overconfidence | en |
| dc.subject | underconfidence | en |
| dc.subject | strategic complementarity | en |
| dc.subject | strategic substitutability | en |
| dc.subject | positive spillover | en |
| dc.subject | negative spillover | en |
| dc.subject.ndc | 330 | - |
| dc.title | Overconfidence, Underconfidence, and Welfare | en |
| dc.type | research report | - |
| dc.type.niitype | Research Paper | - |
| dc.identifier.jtitle | KIER Discussion Paper | en |
| dc.identifier.volume | 903 | - |
| dc.textversion | author | - |
| dc.sortkey | 00903 | - |
| dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
| 出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) | |
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