<論文>G. H. ミードにおける「主我」と主体性 : ラカン精神分析の見地から

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue that the "I" in G.H. Mead has no subjectivity in it, and that the "I" is the subjectivity as a resistance. G.H. Mead has defined the "I" as 'the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others, ' and the "me" as 'the organized set of attitudes of others.' The "I" and the "me" interact mutually (Mead 1934). Then at first, you have to look back at the communication processes, in which the "me" was born. Mead did not start with the Cartesian "Cogito, " the modern autonomous subject. At a scene of communication, for Mead, there is no stable code according to which you encode or decode. So it is a mere fantasy to believe that you could observe a mutual consensus in daily conversation, and it should be understood that only after the actual conversation, the context of it is retrospectively composed. It follows that the "me" in Mead becomes the imaginary in Lacan, and the "I" which interacts with the "me" becomes the difference itself. Certainly, Mead, who believed in 'the universe of discourse' without contradiction, had thrown the difference between 'attitudes of others' into the single concept of the "I". However, that enables him to avoid the perspective of an individual subject to be merely an assemble of the "me"s. Mead could also recover the "I" as the subjectivity of an individual in the dynamic process of self-formation, notwithstanding its feature which is far different from the modern autonomous subject.