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タイトル: 知覚は矛盾を許容するか?
著者: 小口, 峰樹  KAKEN_name
著者名の別形: Oguchi, Mineki
キーワード: the philosophy of perception
the philosophy of neuroscience
conceptualism
nonconceptualism
the waterfall illusion
発行日: 28-Apr-2014
出版者: Japanese Association for the Contemporary and Applied Philosophy (JACAP)
誌名: Contemporary and Applied Philosophy
巻: 5
開始ページ: 1016
終了ページ: 1032
抄録: The purpose of this paper is to defend the conceptualism of perceptual experience by responding to one of the classical arguments for nonconceptualism, that is, the argument from the admissibility of contradiction. According to Crane, the waterfall illusion shows that perception admits of contradiction, unlike belief, and thus provides strong evidence for the claim that the content of perceptual experience is nonconceptual. How can conceptualists respond to this argument? First, I will introduce two possible counterarguments (one dissociating normal experience from illusory experience, the other challenging Crane’s phenomenology) and show that neither is convincing. I will then explain the framework of Matthen’s sensory classification theory and try to respond to Crane’s argument using this framework. The paper concludes that the waterfall illusion does not contain contradictory content and thus that Crane’s argument is untenable.
DOI: 10.14989/200776
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/200776
関連リンク: https://jacap.org/journal/
出現コレクション:vol. 5

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