ダウンロード数: 68
タイトル: | Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands |
著者: | Sano, Ryuji |
発行日: | Feb-2017 |
出版者: | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University |
誌名: | KIER Discussion Paper |
巻: | 963 |
抄録: | This paper considers a dynamic mechanism design in which multiple objects with different consumption deadlines are allocated over time. Agents arrive over time and may have multi-unit demand. We characterize necessary and sufficient condition for periodic ex-post incentive compatibility and provide the optimal mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected revenue under regularity conditions. When complete contingent-contracts are available, the optimal mechanism can be interpreted as an "overbooking" mechanism. The seller utilizes overbooking for screening and price-discriminating advance agents. When agents demand multiple objects as complements, the seller may face a tradeoff between the last-minute price of the current object and the future profit. Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, optimal auction, overbooking, price discrimination, revenue management. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/218656 |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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