<論説>「悪しき慣習」とフランス封建社会 : 権力と真理の関係史の試み

Abstract

一〇世紀末から一二世紀にかけて、フランスの修道院史料には「悪しき慣習(領主的賦課祖) 」とという用語が頻出するようになる。本稿は、この概念とそれを取りまく歴史的状況の考察を行ったものである。第一に、「悪しき慣習」の背後には、それと対峙する正しき権力の規範を模索する動きがみられたことを論じた。第二に、従来の研究は、「慣習」を過去の記憶に依拠する権利として自明視していたが、一二世紀半ば以前の史料からは、「慣習」を証明、主張、確認したりする際に、記憶の調査ではなく、神判・決闘、和解交渉、戦争の勝利者の裁定などが大きな比重を占めたことがあきらかとなった。また所領経営の次元でも、「慣習」の維持や回復は、所領の城砦化、実地での示威的な行使などに依存した。結局、「慣習」をめぐる調査・審問の本格化は、一二世紀後半から一三世紀前半にかけて、民事・刑事裁判、行政統治、教会の管掌領域(異端審問、告解、列聖) などのさまざまな分野で、おなじく過去の出来事や事実を再現する志向が制度化し、あたらしい権力と真理の関係がうまれるのをまたなくてはならなかった。

From the end of the tenth century toward the twelfth century, the words malae consuetudines, literally bad customs, which refer to seigniorial levies and taxes, abound in monastic charters. This article tries to clarify this concept and analyze the historical conditions under which it evolved. Previous studies have been based upon the uncritical association of the malae consuetudines with the maintenance of a collective memory. There are, however, only a small number of documents that mention the inquiry or examination of customs, which has led the author to re-examine the documents and to propose new issues and perspectives. First, it was not until the second half of the twelfth century that institutional and systematic inquiry into customs was gradually introduced. This fact deserves special attention because customs were not the only field in which inquiries, examinations, or hearings were instituted; in criminal law, the investigation of facts, confession, and torture came to be given great importance; in civil law, witnesses and written certification gained precedence as proof; the church systematized the inquisition of heretics, canonizing examination, and sacramental confession; in regional administration of the French monarchy, enqueteurs were sent to investigate the complaints filed by the local communities. The institutionalization of the inquiry into customs is one of this new series of movements related to knowledge and power. Second, it is important to note that the term malae consuetudines presupposed some conception of right or legitimate power. Princes, who were the first landlords to abandon such malae consuetudines to the leading monasteries, also supported their reform movements and accumulation of seigniorial rights. By doing so, the princes tried to present themselves as a model of legitimate power-holders. In the Peace of God, the prelates and secular landlords who gathered never prohibited the self-help activities, such as feuding, but intended to create a new order in which the delicate and difficult distinction between bad and right customs and power was to be established. Third, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when people attempted to argue for or against customs, or prove their legitimacy in lawsuits, disputes, warfare, or land-management, inquiries and examinations were seldom the first choice. In court, the judgments of God and the results of duels could replace them. Accords between disputants easily modified customs without any consultation of the collective memory stock. Victors in war were expected to decide on the abolition or modification of customs. Finally, in order to maintain or revive customs land-managing monks often resorted to fortification of the domains and demonstrative practices on the domain instead of consulting the memories of their peasants.