<論説>コロンボプランの成立とアトリー労働党政権のスターリング政策

Abstract

一九五〇年一一月、南アジア、東南アジアの英連邦諸国・植民地による六ヵ年経済開発計画をまとめた「コロンボプラン」が公表される。従来の研究では、イギリス・アトリー労働党政権のコロンボプラン構想について、東西冷戦が激化するなか南アジア・東南アジア地域の政治的安定をはかり、西側志向を維持しようした政治・外交的意図や、地域でのイギリスの影響力を維持しつつアメリカの協力を取り込もうとした発想を中心において理解されてきた。しかし、コロンボプランの策定プロセスやその具体的構成・内容は、一九四九年から五〇年にかけてのアトリー政権のスターリング政策の展開によって大きな影響を受けたのであり、本稿は、その経過を明らかにすることを課題とする。またアトリー政権のスターリング政策とコロンボプラン構想との密接な連関をふまえたうえで、第二次世界大戦後の新たな世界構造のもとでのスターリングシステムの変容について考察を試みる。

In November 1950, the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia was published. The plan set forth schemes for the economic development of six British Commonwealth states and dependent territories. Many scholars have pointed out two objectives of the Attlee government's policy on the Colombo Plan: stabilising South and Southeast Asia politically and involving the American co-operation while maintaining the British influence in this region. However, it has not been mentioned fully that the Attlee government's sterling policy of 1949-50 crucially impacted the formative process of the Plan as wall as directed its style and contents of the Plan. Although the United Kingdom and the sterling area were hit by a severe dollar crisis in 1949, the Attlee cabinet was unable to adopt the external economic strategy of the 'two-world economy' which would insulate the sterling area from the dollar economy. The Attlee Government confirmed that Britain would continue the 'dollar-earning and saving' policy to improve the balance of payments of the sterling area. One task for strengthening sterling was to settle the accumulated 'sterling balances', that is, Britain's external debt. The balances held by India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Egypt were particularly unstable and large. However, imposing a limit to release these balances would curb their economic development, and it would cause grave political and strategic consequences in this region under the growing Communist threat. The Attlee cabinet began to seek the way to link the settlement of the sterling balances problem with the US aid for Asian countries. In January 1950, the Colombo conference of the British Commonwealth foreign ministers recommended that the respective governments examine the possibilities of co-operation to ensure the region's economic development. Nevertheless, the framework of the programme or the way in which assistance would be provided was not decided. The foreign ministers believed that the success of the programme depended on the American participation and the Truman administration's attitude was first to be confirmed. Meanwhile, the British government began to think that the dollar assistance should not be sought only as a means to draw the American commitments to the region. As noted in the Treasury paper, 'this subject [Asian development] brings together the chief elements in our overseas economy -the viability of the UK and of the whole sterling area, the sterling balances, the long-term world dollar problems and post-ERP [i.e. Marshall Plan] aid'. Thus, a correlation between the Attlee government's sterling policy and the formation of the Colombo Plan was established. Around mid-April, Britain put a formal proposal before the US government. The proposal stated that the dollar-receiving Asian countries should cancel a part of their sterling balances. The following month, the Sydney Commonwealth meeting was called. While the Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender proposed an immediate and emergency assistance action for the region, the British delegates opposed the idea. Instead they argued that Asian countries should make long-term and comprehensive development plans for accelerating the production of food and raw materials. The British delegation also noticed that it was not the physical shortages of particular kinds of commodities or equipments but the limitation of finances that would hinder the progress of the region's development. Britain's priority matters were nurturing the 'dollar-earning and savirig' potentials of the region, drawing dollar aids and discussing the settlement of the sterling balances, all of which would ease the sterling area's dollar problem. The Sydney conference asked the Asian countries to submit a six-year development programme and to inform the amount of the external finance required. Although Britain wasn't able to realise a direct linkage between the US dollar assistance and handling the sterling balances, the concepts and contents of the Colombo Plan, which was approved at the London Commonwealth Conference of September, reflected Britain's viewpoints. The completion of the Plan led to the American participation in the Plan and opened the way for dollar circulation to the region. Therefore, forming the Plan seemed to have positive implications for Britain's sterling policy. In parallel, an agreement was reached in the negotiation for settling the sterling balances. India, Pakistan and Ceylon agreed to use their balances in accordance with the Plan step-by-step manner. In concluding this article, some remarks about the post-war sterling system would be mentioned. First, when we discuss the nature of the post-war British Empire-Commonwealth, it is important to consider the sterling system as a whole. It is insufficient to focus on the bilateral relations between the UK and the Commonwealth countries/colonies. Second, in the post-war situation, Britain could not unilaterally mobilise the resources of the Commonwealth members for the metropolitan needs. Britain itself had to bear additional burdens in sustaining the sterling system. Hence, the Attlee government turned its attention to exploiting the colonial financial resources. The Colombo Plan had implications in terms of the changes in the power balances among the sterling area members. However, the colonial resources were not sufficient to support sterling. Britain required the American assistance. The US administration had been sceptical of the British imperial economic system; however the Americans could not reject the Attlee government's proposals of the Colombo Plan bluntly. Considering the intensification of the cold war rivalry, the Truman administration had no choice but to acknowledge the importance of the sterling system for the Western economy and had to discuss the problem of the sterling balances and the world dollar shortage. The formation of the Colombo Plan and the Anglo-American discussions there reflected the transformation of the sterling system into an 'imperialism of decolonization' under the emerging post-war world structures.