<論説>竇融期の河西統治制度と対外政策

Abstract

従来、竇融期の簡牘は充分な批判なく前漢時代の制度復元に利用されてきた。この様な傾向は、竇融期の統治制度の独自性の有無が充分に研究されていないことに由来する。本稿は、第一章で竇融政権の成立状況・河西の社会状勢を、第二章で竇融政権の統治制度を、第三章で竇融政権の対外政策を考察することにより、竇融期の河西統治制度の独自性及び実態を検討する。三章にわたる考証を通じて、竇融期特有の社会状勢及び竇融政権が軍事・人事に関して大将軍府への集権化に成功したが、特定の行政事務に関しては太守府の仲介・補助を必要とする歪な権力構造であったこと、そして制度的・構造的には一貫して大将軍府が河西統治の実権を掌握していたことを論証する。最終的に、竇融期の河西統治制度と前漢時代の制度の差異を確認し、竇融期の簡牘の使用法に関する問題を提起する。

Records on wooden slips from the period of the rule of Dou Rong 寶融in Hexi, which have not been sufficiently studied, have been used to reconstruct the system of the Former Han Dynasty. This is a result of a failure to sufficiently study the unique character of the rule during the Dou Rong period. This article examines in three sections the system of rule in Hexi during the Dou Rong period as well as its structure and character. In the first section, I emphasize the circumstances of the founding of the regime established by Dou Rong and the social circumstances in Hexi. I demonstrate the following two points in my examination. First, I show that the regime established by Dou Rong was a regime that emphasized military affairs based on the military system of the Former Han, Second, I show that the Hexi regions ruled by Dou Rong were saddled by two problems-that of population increase and that of economic turmoil. In the second section, I place special attention to the re-organization of the military and administrative structure of the system of rule established by Dou Rong. As a result, I was able to demonstrate the following three points. First, I demonstrate that during the Dou Rong period the office of the chief commandant 都尉府, which had been a subordinate office under the office of the governor 大守府, came under the jurisdiction of the office of the general-in-chief 大将軍府, the office occupied by Dou Rong. Secondly, I show that during the Dou Rong period the office of general-in-chief succeeded in suppressing the authority of the office of governor in matters concerned with the military and personnel. Thirdly, in contrast to the successful concentration of power in the office of the general-in-chief, I demonstrate that it was necessary to obtain the cooperation of the office of governor in regard to administration. As a result, I clarify that in contrast to the successful concentration of authority by the office of the general-in-chief in terms of military and personnel matters, it was not in fact able to complete the concentration of authority over political administration. In the third section, I chiefly consider the foreign policy of the regime established by Dou Rong. I view the subjugation of the regime established by Dou Rong to the Later Han Dynasty as ground breaking. In the third section I demonstrate the following three points. First, I show that prior to the 29th year of the Common Era, the Hexi regions were not under the rule of Kuixiao 隗囂, and that Dou Rong ruled in Hexi. Secondly, I demonstrate that Hexi under the rule of Dou Rong by receiving the protection of the Later Han Dynasty, attempted to construct a stable relationship with the regions west of China. Thirdly, I show also that after the year 29, Dou Rong made the personnel decisions of the high-ranking officials of the Hexi regions, and Dou Rong also created the laws. As a result I clarify the fact that the office of general-in-chief whose top post was held by Dou Rong maintained rule over the Hexi regions after the year 29 and not prior to it. Through these considerations in the three sections, I confirmed that the system and structure of rule over Hexi that was established by Dou Rong was strikingly different from that of the Former Han Dynasty. Then, I propose that it will be impossible to reconstruct the system of the Former Han Dynasty using the wooden slips of the Dou Rong period without studying them sufficiently.