ロックにおける観念と実在

Abstract

In this article, I have tried to make clear the theory for the knowledge of the external world, by examining Locke's 'Essay'. The so-called 'representative theory of perception' which was set forth by Locke in the typical form -- what characters and problems does it have? And is it truely valid as the theory for the knowledge of the external world? It is our central aim to answer these questions. According to Locke, our ideas are in our mind, and outside the mind there is an external, material world which is subject to the causality. These two worlds are quite foreign, and the latter produces the former. After examining Book 2. Chapter 8. of the Essay, which contains the famous description concerning the primary and the secondary qualities, we found that the ideas which apprehend the external object as it is in itself have following characters. That is, the characters that they are effects caused by the external objects, and that the causation is based on GOD. On the other hand, we found in the Essay the description which is able to confirm our supposition. In Book 2. Chapter 30, 31, and 32, Locke says that the ground for the reality, adequacy, and truth of ideas consists equally in the following points. (1) That when we receive these ideas, our mind is utterly passive. (2) That they are effects caused by the qualities of the external things. (3) That this causal relation is nothing more than that of correspondence. In the meanwhile, Locke concedes repeatedly that we know the external world only indirectly by the intervention of representatives i. e. ideas. And furthermore he says virtually that in the reception of simple ideas our mind are not utterly passive. This activity of our mind is supposed to get our knowledge of the external world to release from its indirectness. But the author thinks that this solution is not sufficient. When we inquire into the condition for the establishment of the objective, real knowledge about the external world, we should remove the limit of 'knowledge', and turn our eyes to the total action, in which the problems of 'knowledge' are to be properly situated. And the problem itself is supposed to be solved only when we think so.