知覚ともの―ヒューム哲学を手懸かりに―

Abstract

In this paper, I propose to clarify the conception of 'perception' and defend a kind of representationalism. First, I examine Hume's theory of perception, focusing on perception of external objects. Using Hume's argument, I conclude that we should distinguish 'perception' in philosophical theories from the concept of 'object' found in ordinary life. Then I proceed to investigate the causal theory of perception (CTP). I show that Hume seems to have assumed CTP although he could not admit at least as a part of his own theory. I reject CTP because the causal connection between physical objects and mental representations CTP postulates is not supported by scientific evidence. We should admit only scientific analysis which explains the causal connection completely in the physical domain. Three different descriptions of the perception can be distinguished; (a) ordinary language : "I see the desk, " (b) scientific analysis : "the physical object causes the brain state, " and (c) representational analysis : "visual perception occurred in me." If we separate these three levels of description, we can avoid a great number of problems with the theory of perception. Although representational analysis (c) is controversial, I believe it is necessary and useful in clarifying the structure and function of perception. It is also the method Hume used in his own philosophy.