現象論は何事かを語り得ているのか

Abstract

Exist' is said of the thing which is at least being thought of. When this thought is true, the object of thought really exists. And the thought is true when it describes exactly what is actually experienced or is founded on a thought being true. What is actually experienced, however, really is a series of ideas, say, phenomena. Therefore the thought is true only as the description of phenomena. Thus, the things that really exist are phenomena indeed. This is a phenomenalism concerning the status of the object of perception. For this assertion seems incompatible with the understanding of common sense because of its uncommon usage of words, it is notorious among philosophers who hate revisionary metaphysics. But phenomenalism does not mean to deny the common sense understanding. It means to say this; though we cannot know the existence of physical objects only through sense experiences occurring at given moments, all contents of common understanding can be described as series of ideas, say, phenomena, without referring to physical objects. And the terms in which phenomena are described are technical terms, so the criticism that the use of words by phenomenalist deviates from the ordinary usage of language is pointless. Thus phenomenalism is not obviously an absurd assertion and seems to say something meaningfully. Yet it is not clear whether phenomenalism can say what it means to say. So in this paper by describing the context where the given to sense experience is cut off from common understanding of experience, I will make clear what phenomenalism can say meaningfully. In short I will assert this. In the common sense understanding, physical objects constitute of reality and the fleeting sense experiences constitute of phenomena. These are assigned to the acts of knowing respectively, say, reality to thinking, phenomena to sensing. In this way showing the duality of act of knowing corresponding to the status of what is known makes the apparent meaningfullness of the assertion of phenomenalism. But as far as this duality is held, thinking goes beyond the realm of phenomena, then phenomenalism cannot be held. On the other hand, when by the certainty postulated as the base of knowledge these acts are fused into one, the concept of phenomenon will have had no distinct meaning. Then phenomenalism will become a recommendation of a poor understanding of the world.