ロックの観念が持つ存在論的身分―アルノーの観念との比較的考察―

Abstract

In this paper, my intention is to elucidate the ontological status of Locke's ideas. Generally "ideas" means the mental entities which are the objects of understanding. Recently some scholars reinterpreted Locke's ideas as perceptual acts and maintained the affinity of Locke with Arnauld. I, however, think it impossible to consider Locke's ideas as acts. First, Arnauld's ideas are certainly perceptual acts. He denies ideas as real entities, criticizing Malebranche. Arnauld claims that ideas are modifications of the mind which are intrinsically representational. So, in his theory of perception, perceptual acts function as perceptual contents at the same time, and the direct objects of perception are the bodies themselves. Second, Locke's ideas cannot be regarded as perceptual acts. In his texts, Locke considers ideas not as perceptual acts but as mental contents of perception. Moreover, he distinguishs ideas from the qualities of bodies and denies the direct perception of bodies. These ideas acquire their representational function just through their causal relation with bodies. This fact makes it fundamentally impossible to equate them with perceptual acts. Then, does Locke's ideas become the redundant entities between the external world and the mind? Although Locke's ideas are not perceptual acts, they are mind - dependent, so they are always associated with acts. Locke's ideas can be interpreted as a different modifications of the mind aparted from the acts. Like Arnauld, Locke uses the concept "ideas" technically to express perceptual contents without regarding them as real entities. But his aim is achieved without considering ideas as acts.