関係的述語と実在的関係―ライプニッツ哲学における個体と個体概念をめぐって―

Abstract

The notion of relational predicate, which was distinguished from relation itself in the philosophy of Leibniz, was first introduced in the interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy by J. Hintikka and H. Ishiguro. However, they argued it mainly from a logical point of view. Through a close study of Leibniz's metaphysics, this paper aims to make clear and evaluate the essential points of the interpretation of M. Mugnai, who recently regarded the relational predicate as an important element in Leibniz's philosophy, to sort out the points that can be agreed upon from those that cannot. In my view, Mugnai's interpretation is appropriate in that it emphasizes that the relational predicates of an individual notion must be based on the inner properties of the individual. But on the other hand, he distinguishes between the individual notion and the individual substance, attributing the relational predicates to the individual notion, not to the individual substance, which does not include anything relational. In view of Leibniz's ontology, this way of thinking is one-dimensional. The properties of an individual substance are formed through the relationships with other individual substances in the same universe and relational predicates express such relations, i.e. real relations.