<論文>ヘーゲル判断論における思考と存在との同一性としての真理 --カントの超越論的真理との比較--

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Hegel's concept of truth as the identity of thought and being in his theory of judgment. In his Science of Logic, Hegel presupposes "the liberation from the opposition of consciousness"(GW21, 33), that is, the opposition between consciousness and its objects. Hence, Hegel's Logic presupposes the identity of thought and being. Christoph Halbig reads Hegel's identity thesis as the identity theory of truth. According to the latter, the truth of judgement consists in the identity of judgement's content with a state of affairs in the world. However, Hegel's identity thesis does not consist between the individual content of the empirical judgement and the individual state of affairs, i.e., on the empirical level, but between "thought-determinations" and "the essentialities of things", i.e., on the fundamental level. To explain this, I compare Hegel's identity thesis with Kant's concept of "transcendental truth" in the Critique of Pure Reason, which "precedes all empirical [truth], and makes it possible"(KrV, B185). The transcendental truth is the correspondence between a judgement in general and its possible object, while the empirical truth is the correspondence between an empirical judgement and its individual object. I try to show that Hegel's identity thesis, like Kant's transcendental truth, makes all empirical truth (i. e., correctness, for Hegel) possible.