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ファイル | 記述 | サイズ | フォーマット | |
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DP1065.pdf | 396.81 kB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
タイトル: | Technological Competition, Cumulative Innovation, and Technological Development Schemes |
著者: | Ambashi, Masahito |
キーワード: | technological competition cumulative innovation technological development scheme grant-back clause L24 O32 O34 |
発行日: | Aug-2021 |
出版者: | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University |
誌名: | KIER Discussion Paper |
巻: | 1065 |
開始ページ: | 1 |
終了ページ: | 26 |
抄録: | This study investigates which technological development schemes are most desirable for technological competition and cumulative innovation, including follow-on innovation, under uncertainty conditions. Technological competition is likely to generate a social overincentive for innovations; it does so for follow-on innovation, especially when the consumer surplus is negligible. This study determines that a contract with a grant-back clause combined with an appropriate profit distribution mitigates social overinvestment in both initial and follow-on innovation; and therefore, improves social welfare. Moreover, this study demonstrates that if a government can specify a particular profit distribution between firms, the socially optimal investment in initial innovation can be realized. Conversely, assuming a significantly positive consumer surplus instead, this study reveals that competition in follow-on innovation creates a higher level of social welfare. |
記述: | Revised: September 2021 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/269658 |
関連リンク: | https://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/publication/?cat=en |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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