無我思想に於ける業の槪念

Abstract

In this article, I examined one of the most vehemently debated questions in connection with Buddhist Philosophy, i. e. : whether or not there is inconsistency, between the theories of anattā (not-self) and kamma (action). Substantially, in this paper, a logical survey of the problem from the point of view of the Early Buddhist Canon will be suggested. According to Buddhist Philosophy, we are taught that a human being has no "self", but at the same time we are taught the dogma of kamma, a concept which would be impossible without the presupposition of a "substance" of some sort. Thus a question has often been put to the following effect : "If a human being has no self, who and or what is it that transmigrates according to his own action?" Now, the Buddhist proposition, "All. things are not-self, " would seemingly be a case of the infinite judgement : "S is non-A." In this judgement, only A is completely excluded, that is, the possibility of all other realms such as B, C, or D, etc. is implied in non-A. Hence the judgement does not become absolutely established since no positive provision is made for the remaining realms such as B, C, or D, etc.; consequently, when it is said that "All things are not-self, " then notself should be considered as a positive rather than a negative entity. What, then, is this positive entity just mentioned? It is nothing other than Kamma. The positive something implied means that man knows himself as being bound by kamma. Though similar in form, the Buddhist formula and the infinite judgement must be distinguished. The not-self does not mean a separatereality at all (as it would in the case of infinite judgement), as a separate reality in any sense of the word is denied by the Buddhists. Notself would have no reality and hence no validity. Not-self reveals itself to man only because he is conscious of kamma. Kamma, in turn, usually finds itself involved in the experience of notself, which could, as we have seen, not appear but through kamma. Kamma is first of all tested in anattā, but anattā is, in turn, tested by kamma. Kamma is not separated from not-self (anattā) but it is the categorical form of not-self. These two doctrines were not preached from the philosophical point of view. Therefore, more important than the admission of incongruity between the two doctrines is the fact that both are concentrated in the experience of the person as a genuine unity. It is only the human being who is able to involve both concepts of kamma and anattā as a genuine unity.