ヒュームに於ける「外界」と「自我」の問題 (完)

Abstract

The author contends that a realistic interpretation of Hume's theory of perception will lead us to a solution not only of the problem of the external world, but also of that of personal identity in his philosophy. The key for the interpretation suggested lies in his actual acceptance of the causal theory of perception. Hume says that all our sense-perceptions exist only in the mind, and their existence depends entirely upon it. By this he means that their existence depends causally upon our own body. If therefore this is true, there must at least be our own body. Although Hume says that our knowledge of the external world cannot be extended beyond the reach of our sense-perceptions, his basic view of sense-perceptions presupposes the existence of our own body. The truth is that the adequate explanation of our sense-perceptions requires the real existence not only of our own body, but also of the whole of the external world. Such a realistic interpretation of Hume's theory of perception as the author propounds, will also throw light on the problem of personal identity. As above explained, all our sense-perceptions depend causally upon our own body. And according to Hume, all the rest of our perceptions depend causally upon our sense-perceptions. It therefore follows that all our perceptions at bottom depend causally upon our own body. In view of this, the author claims that so far as our own body exists, the whole of those different perceptions which, as Hume says, constitute our mind, can be regarded as one mind. Hume treats the problem of personal identity based on those relations which our perceptions bear to each other. The author, however, proposes to deal with our perceptions on the basis of their causal dependence upon our own body. The author further discusses the problem of the self. In the Appendix to his Treatise, Hume reconsiders his own doctrine of personal identity, and finds it unsatisfactory. He sees that his rejection of the self as a substance results in the contradiction with his psychological explanation of personal identity. The clue to get out of this labyrinth seems to be in the clarification of the relation between the knower and the known in cognitive activity. To treat this point sufficiently, it would be necessary to consider the problem of the intentionality of consciousness.