カマラシーラの直接知覚論における「意による認識」 (manasa)

Abstract

This article is an investigation into how Kamalaśīla, an eminent Indian Buddhist scholar in the eighth century, uses the word "mānasa" in his Tattvasamgrahapañjikā, especially in the commentary on the stanzas 1329 and 3380-88 of the Tattvasamgraha by his teacher Śāntaraksita. The result of this research reveals that mānasa, meaning "mental cognition" (mānasam jñānam), is used in the sense of either "mental perception" (mānasapratyaksa), "yogic perception" (yogipratyaksa) or "conceptual cognition" (vikalpajñāna) according to the context where the word in question is used. As such, mānasa is a synonym of manovijñāna and an antonym of indriyajñāna (sensory cognition). In particular, Kamalaśīla states that "mental cognition" in stanza 1329 should be construed either in the sense of mental perception or yogic perception. However, this does not mean that the notion of mental perception and that of yogic perception are the same in Kamalaśīla's theory of perception, but means that both of these different types of perception belong to mental cognition. Commenting on stanzas 3380-88, Kamalaśīla explains what the Buddha's omniscient cognition is. He takes it to be a type of yogic perception, but it cannot be the same as mental perception defined by Dharmakīrti. Also, the usages of the above-mentioned technical terms in the Bhāvanākrama, another important work by Kamalaśīla, as well as those in Dharmakīrti's works, are partially examined in this article. In conclusion, Kamalaśīla's view on the types of perceptual cognition is shown by the following diagram : [Figure omitted] Notes a) [1] [2] [3] [4] are the four types of direct perception enumerated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. b) Two types of cognition marked with *are regarded as direct perception only in the case [3b].