徳と認識 : トマス・アクィナスにおける親和性による認識

Abstract

Thomas Aquinas claims that there are two different ways to attain a correct judgment (S. T. II-II, q. 45, a.2, c.). One way is through a perfect use of reason and another is through "connaturality (connaturalitas)." Through "connaturality, " Aquinas claims, those who possess virtue of chastity judge such matters correctly and those who possess virtue of charity judges divine matters correctly and more perfectly. This article intends to clarify the cognitive mechanism and philosophical importance of "cognition through connaturality" in Aquinas. For a brief sketch over its philosophical importance, I borrow some arguments from contemporary epistemology, specifically "virtue epistemology." I point out the similarities between Aquinas's claims on "cognition through connaturality" and those by virtue epistemologists. After this introduction into its philosophical importance, I explain what "cognition through connnaturality" is and how it occurs. For this purpose, I analyze the meaning of the "connaturality" based on his texts and conclude that the "connaturality" in question is the aptitude formed in our appetitive powers. Then, I explain how the connaturality functions in our attainment of the cognition. Based on his accounts of the mechanism of cognition, I conclude that the cognizer becomes the object by him or herself becoming like the object. Virtues help the cognizer's becoming like the object, bringing the connaturality to the cognizer. After this clarification of the mechanism, I introduce his detailed descriptions of the moral and religious cognition through connaturality. I try to analyze in each case why this mode of cognition is philosophically important. Through the investigation, we shall understand that Aquinas's notion of "cognition through connaturality" has much in common with the concerns of virtue epistemologists. Both of them claim that virtues of the cognizer play a crucial role in our attainment of knowledge and save "particularity, " "affectivity, " and "noninferentiality" as aspects of human knowledge. A further significance of Aquinas' s philosophical position is that he realizes that both "perfect use of reason" and "connaturality" are indispensable means for the attainment and the development of human knowledge.