ロールズの第二原理とその平等主義的性格 (上)

Abstract

John Rawls' theory of justice as fairness has often been regarded as an origin of "luck egalitarianism" in contemporary political philosophy. This paper aims to argue against this view and explore the true egalitarian character underlying Rawls' theory of justice. This paper is divided into two main parts. In this first part Rawls' argument for the difference principle is discussed. While Rawls claims that social contingencies or natural chance on the determination of distributive shares are equally arbitrary from moral point of view, it is uncertain how the difference principle, which requires that social and economic inequalities contribute to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, is defended by this claim. Then a luck egalitarian interpretation proposed by Brian Barry is examined. Even though this interpretation seems to illuminate the hidden inference unexplained by Rawls himself and to present a persuasive argument for the difference principle, it turns out that this argument itself is untenable and there remains a need for an alternative interpretation.