<研究論文(原著論文)>顕在-潜在ギャップと道徳的責任

Abstract

An individual's implicit attitude assessed by indirect measures sometimes conflicts with his/her explicit attitude assessed by direct measures. This phenomenon is sometimes called the explicit implicit gap. The aim of this paper is to examine the problem with moral responsibility in the context of this gap. First, I will introduce a contemporary form of racism called aversive racism as a typical example of the explicit implicit gap. Aversive racists explicitly and sincerely acknowledge egalitarian values, whereas they implicitly have negativity towards racial minorities such as Blacks in the United States. It has been shown that aversive racists exhibit a specific pattern of discriminatory behavior under certain circumstances. Based on the framework of aversive racism, I clarify how the problem with moral responsibility for behavior in the context of the explicit implicit gap can be formulated. Then, I examine whether aversive racists can be morally responsible for their own behavior. In the spirit of attributionism, I here consider two possibilities respectively: One is the possibility that their behavior expresses the values shown in their explicit attitudes. The other is the possibility that it expresses the values shown in their implicit attitudes. As a result, it turns out that both possibilities are denied. Finally, I argue that we can draw three possible conclusions from this discussion. (1) Since the discussion indicates that values shown in either explicit or implicit attitudes of aversive racists are not reflected in their behavior, we cannot attribute moral responsibility to them. In other words, aversive racists are not morally responsible for their behavior at all. (2) The discussion in terms of attributionism is just a starting point for further considerations. It means that we should examine the applicability of other theories of moral responsibility to the explicit implicit gap. (3) The discussion encourages us to modify attributionism itself. In particular, we should reconsider the nature of the key concept of attributionism, namely the real self.