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dc.contributor.author | Herrera-Velasquez, Jose de Jesus | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-07T04:04:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-10-07T04:04:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-09 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/276617 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This study explores the reciprocal effects between agency problems and market competition. We develop an adverse selection model of a competing conglomerate with production constraints. The conglomerate participates as the leader in two different duopolistic markets with a Stackelberg-Cournot framework and heterogeneous goods. The conglomerate is run by its headquarters and two division managers. The agency problem arises because the market demand size is a manager's private information, which the headquarters try to elicit by a contract mechanism. We fully characterize a first and a second-best contract. When the production constraints make the first best outcome unattainable, the second-best contract is either separating or pooling, depending on the severity of the constraints. The separating second-best contract sometimes improves the ex-ante welfare in comparison to a symmetric information benchmark. The pooling second-best contract never improves the ex-ante welfare. We also find that at an intermediate level of substitutability, the second-best contract is most likely to coincide with the first-best one, and any departure from that level toward either substitutability or complementarity makes the attainment of the first-best outcome less likely. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University | en |
dc.publisher.alternative | 京都大学経済研究所 | ja |
dc.subject | C70 | en |
dc.subject | D21 | en |
dc.subject | D43 | en |
dc.subject | D82 | en |
dc.subject | D86 | en |
dc.subject | L13 | en |
dc.subject | Adverse Selection | en |
dc.subject | Contract Mechanism | en |
dc.subject | Multimarket Competition | en |
dc.subject | Stackelberg Oligopoly | en |
dc.subject | Production Constraint | en |
dc.subject.ndc | 330 | - |
dc.title | Agency Problems in a Competitive Conglomerate with Production Constraints | en |
dc.type | research report | - |
dc.type.niitype | Research Paper | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | KIER Discussion Paper | en |
dc.identifier.volume | 1083 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 38 | - |
dc.textversion | author | - |
dc.sortkey | 01083 | - |
dc.address | Kyoto University, Graduate School of Economics | en |
dc.relation.url | https://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/publication/?cat=en | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
datacite.awardNumber | 20J13138 | - |
datacite.awardNumber.uri | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-20J13138/ | - |
jpcoar.funderName | 日本学術振興会 | ja |
jpcoar.awardTitle | コングロマリット型統合 | ja |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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