ダウンロード数: 306
タイトル: | Worker collusion and organization design : effects of interpersonal interaction |
著者: | Itoh, Hideshi |
キーワード: | Moral hazard Worker collusion Risk sharing Interpersonal interaction Effort allocation Team production Socialization |
発行日: | Dec-1988 |
出版者: | 京都大学経済学部 |
引用: | Itoh, Hideshi. "Worker collusion and organization design : effects of interpersonal interaction". [京都大学経済学部] Working paper. 京都大学経済学部, 1988, No.9, [37]p. |
誌名: | 京都大学経済学部Working Paper |
号: | 9 |
抄録: | This paper examines hidden action models of the relationship between a firm and multiple workers, and identifies cases where the firm prefers workers to collude via a binding agreement on their action choice. Worker collusion and appropriately redesigned wage contracts have a risk sharing advantage (i) when workers' action choice is completely independent; (ii) when the firm wants each worker to allocate his effort efficiently among various productive activities; or (iii) when team production exists. Worker collusion also achieves an efficient level of "socialization" among workers while noncooperative behavior leads to "under -socialization." |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/37904 |
出現コレクション: | Working Paper (外国語論文) |
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