このアイテムのアクセス数: 336
| タイトル: | Overconfidence, Underconfidence, and Welfare |
| 著者: | Asano, Takao Kunieda, Takuma Shibata, Akihisa |
| キーワード: | overconfidence underconfidence strategic complementarity strategic substitutability positive spillover negative spillover |
| 発行日: | Sep-2014 |
| 出版者: | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University |
| 誌名: | KIER Discussion Paper |
| 巻: | 903 |
| 抄録: | Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent's overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive spillovers and an agent's underconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and negative spillovers can lead to Pareto improvement. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/189748 |
| 出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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