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DP1089.pdf | 388.59 kB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
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DCフィールド | 値 | 言語 |
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dc.contributor.author | Woo, Dohui | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-01-12T07:44:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-01-12T07:44:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022-12 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/278351 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Experts with different abilities of information acquisition who receive multiple pieces of signals over time can choose the timing of recommendation and whether to be truthful in a later period, when a recommendation is made in an earlier period. Giving inconsistent recommendations may be seen as a sign of a poor information acquisition ability, but it can also work as a “safety net” that prevents the worst reputation. This study uses a simple binary-ability framework to capture this aspect and proposes equilibriums where all information is delivered truthfully on the path. I examine when such an equilibrium exists, and compare such equilibriums with those where only partial information is delivered; it is found that the former brings higher expected payoffs to the expert than the latter under a certain range of parameters when the utility function is strictly convex in the reputation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University | en |
dc.publisher.alternative | 京都大学経済研究所 | ja |
dc.subject | D72 | en |
dc.subject | L14 | en |
dc.subject | truth-telling | en |
dc.subject | reputation concerns | en |
dc.subject | cheap talks | en |
dc.subject.ndc | 330 | - |
dc.title | Truth-telling Outcomes in a Reputational Cheap-talk Game with Binary Types | en |
dc.type | research report | - |
dc.type.niitype | Research Paper | - |
dc.identifier.jtitle | KIER Discussion Paper | en |
dc.identifier.volume | 1089 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 13 | - |
dc.textversion | author | - |
dc.sortkey | 01089 | - |
dc.address | Kyoto University, Graduate School of Economics | en |
dc.relation.url | https://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/publication/?cat=en | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
datacite.awardNumber | 20J13076 | - |
datacite.awardNumber.uri | https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-20J13076/ | - |
jpcoar.funderName | 日本学術振興会 | ja |
jpcoar.awardTitle | 情報取得能力と情報公開戦略に基づく評判形成の分析 | ja |
出現コレクション: | KIER Discussion Paper (英文版) |
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