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ファイル | 記述 | サイズ | フォーマット | |
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j.jet.2022.105511.pdf | 1.42 MB | Adobe PDF | 見る/開く |
タイトル: | Menu Mechanisms |
著者: | Mackenzie, Andrew Zhou, Yu ![]() ![]() |
著者名の別形: | 周, 愚 |
キーワード: | D47 D82 C78 Menu mechanism Strategy-proofness Robust implementation |
発行日: | Sep-2022 |
出版者: | Elsevier BV |
誌名: | Journal of Economic Theory |
巻: | 204 |
論文番号: | 105511 |
抄録: | We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocation, and elections. |
著作権等: | © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2433/279288 |
DOI(出版社版): | 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105511 |
出現コレクション: | 学術雑誌掲載論文等 |

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